teaching and research staff, visiting professors, graduate students, visiting fellows, and invited participants in seminars, workshops, and conferences. As usual, authors bear full responsibility for the content of their contributions. 
Introduction
Political communities marred by longstanding, bitter conflict find it extremely difficult to end that conflict, even if most members of the community suffer its effects and wish it could be resolved. The conflicts are often chronically self-reinforcing: violent eruptions reproduce incentives for parties, leaders, and ordinary individuals to act in ways that perpetuate the dynamic. Such conflicts were modelled in Thomas Hobbes's account of the state of nature, and formalized by game theorists as the prisoner's dilemma. The "Troubles" in Northern Ireland, the racial conflicts in South Africa, the Israeli-Palestinian conflicts today -others could be added -display the incentives and behavior patterns that keep such cycles going. It is difficult to discover a way out.
Hobbes insisted that only an all-powerful sovereign could break the cycle and bring civil peace (Hobbes [1651 (Hobbes [ ] 2010 . But communities characterized by chronic conflict either lack an effective sovereign, or perhaps worse, possess a state asserting sovereign authority which itself propels the conflict because it is perceived as illegitimate by a substantial proportion of the population. The South African apartheid state, for example, possessed a powerful military, an effective legal and bureaucratic apparatus, and strong political support among white South Africans; but it was powerless to impose a solution to a racial conflict driven in large part by the very character of that state.
Nor is partition an assured solution. Territorially separate states can sometimes minimize conflict by disengaging. That is more difficult where communities in conflict share the same territory, as in South Africa, Northern Ireland, and the former Yugoslavia, where the worst instances of ethnic cleansing and genocide occurred after partition, not before. In South Africa overturning the "Homelands" policy, a forced racial partition on extremely unequal terms, was one of the chief aims of the anti-apartheid movement. Even to agree on fair terms of partition, and ultimately separate states (an outcome generally favored in the IsraeliPalestinian case), requires a degree of inter-communal cooperation that is difficult to achieve given the conflict's bitter history.
Democratic franchise is not by itself a solution, without democratic institutions regarded on all sides as fair and legitimate. What characterizes contemporary communities marked by chronic conflict is not that they lack democratic practices altogether, but that they are flawed democracies: polities that depend on appeals to democratic legitimacy which the system itself conspicuously fails to embody (Jung et. al. 2011, 83-86) . The leaders of battling groups are not monarchs able to arrange a pact and then impose it on their respective subjects. In flawed democracies political leaders --even as they engage in difficult negotiations with leaders of rival groups --are accountable to separate constituencies, which retain the power to replace their leaders, and to block any agreement the constituency has not been persuaded to support. In commencing a risky reform process in 1990, for example, South African President F.W. de Klerk looked to a future in which South Africans of all races would enjoy political rights in some form. But his reforms would have been stillborn if in the early 1990s he had lost majority support among white South Africans. Democratic institutions at their best hold leaders accountable to the community as a whole, potentially rewarding leaders who successfully bridge longstanding divides. But flawed democratic institutions often reinforce the very conflicts that prevent agreement on better democratic institutions.
It is tempting to categorize some conflicts as simply beyond resolution: to view the interests at stake as inherently zero-sum, one side's gain being the other's loss, and to dismiss as illusory any lasting, mutually-acceptable settlement. Today it is not uncommon to hear the Israeli-Palestinian conflict described this way: both sides make exclusive claims to the same territory, invoke irreconcilable religious identities to support those claims, and resort to violence that the other side can neither forgive nor forget. Perpetual war thus seems inevitable. But similar claims were made about South Africa in the 1980s. Indeed at the time, a peaceful resolution in South Africa looked less likely than in the Middle East. Few observers then believed that white South Africans, whose military power remained unmatched on the African continent, would accept a multiracial state ruled by a black majority. They did not understand that to characterize a conflict as inherently zero-sum because of rival parties' irreconcilable interests and values is to miss important ways in which events themselves, and the words and actions of leaders with a hand in those events, can reshape participants' political preferences and their perceptions about the nature of the conflict.
In this essay we argue that risk-taking acts of political leadership, marked by what we call strategically hopeful action, are needed to extract positive-sum outcomes from apparently zero-sum conflicts. These acts clear the way for agreement on new political institutions that are cured of the flaws that undermined the old order's legitimacy. Our theme is not leadership in general, but leadership of a specific kind exercised under especially difficult circumstances. Our principal case study is the leadership of Nelson Mandela and F.W. de Klerk that made possible (though by no means guaranteed) the South African democratic transition. Later we discuss the contrasting leadership records of the Northern Ireland settlement and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. We illuminate strategically hopeful leadership by examining game theoretic models of conflict and cooperation in the work of Robert Axelrod, Thomas Schelling, and Josep Colomer, all of whom highlight important dimensions of the problem but underplay the specific risks and contributions of leadership. Finally we show how strategically hopeful leadership embodies a variable-sum understanding of power.
II. Strategically Hopeful Action
By strategically hopeful action we mean a certain kind of calculated risk-taking in the face of imponderably complex circumstances, the aim of which is to improve some aspect of the political and social world (at least in the actor's judgment). The paradoxical overtones of "strategically hopeful" are intentional: the phrase blends aspects of political action typically kept separate. The action we have in mind is strategic, in that attempts to resolve chronic communal conflicts without hardheaded calculation would be merely wishful thinking, and in some circumstances dangerously reckless. The action in question is hopeful in that it communicates a willingness to strengthen historical adversaries and take personal risks for a better future when key determinants of that future are, at best, imponderable. Displaying hope adds a performative ingredient at a time when it is vitally necessary. In periods of rapid political and institutional flux (like South Africa in the early 1990s) it is impossible for any leader to foresee, much less control, the wider flow of events. But a skilled leader can estimate to a degree the likely responses of an adversary to an unexpected opening. Among other skills this requires empathy, the capacity to imagine oneself in another's place and comprehend how the conflict looks from their perspective. This was a skill both Mandela and de Klerk possessed to an impressive degree.
We illuminate strategically hopeful action by drawing from game theoretic models, and in particular the iterated prisoner's dilemma featured in the work of Robert Axelrod (Axelrod 1984; 1997) . But in contrast to Axelrod's unitary rational actors, we highlight the strategic dilemmas that confront individual leaders as they try to resolve chronic conflict while retaining the support of refractory constituencies. Bitter communal conflicts are usefully viewed as prisoners' dilemmas because most people on both sides would gain, compared to the miserable status quo, were they able to cooperate. But in the absence of either mutual trust, or a third party able to enforce an agreement, no party has a good reason to cooperate with the result that potential mutual gains are not realized. This will hold both for a singleshot prisoner's dilemma and for a repeated interaction where the stakes are high and the number of rounds is known beforehand.
Actual communal conflicts are often of uncertain duration, which opens up more interesting possibilities explored by Robert Axelrod. If A knows that she will face B again in the future (in an iterated interaction of indefinite length), and that B can retaliate in round (n+1) for what A does in round (n), then it might be in A's interest to cooperate in hopes that B will reciprocate; and in B's interest to reciprocate because if he defects, A will retaliate in the following round. This is the essence of "TIT FOR TAT": cooperate on the first round and then do whatever the other player does (Axelrod 1984, 13) . But A takes a risk by cooperating first. If instead of reciprocating, B exploits A's cooperative move by defecting, A then defects on the next round, B is likely to defect again in turn, and the result is a self-reinforcing and mutuallycostly cycle of defection. In contrast to a one-shot prisoner's dilemma, where the preferred strategy is always the same (defect whatever the other does), the indefinitely iterated prisoner's dilemma is more open-ended and selecting a strategy is a genuine choice.
Axelrod found that the "nice" strategy of TIT-FOT-TAT won in computer simulations of iterated dilemmas of indefinite length, beating out a wide range of alternative strategies. The irony is that although TIT-FOR-TAT offers the highest average payoff, in any given round it never scores better than the other player, and always scores lower than an opponent who responds to cooperation by defecting. But players who pursue "nasty" strategies score badly against other "nasty" players: each drags the other down. TIT FOR TAT won "not by beating the other player, but by eliciting behavior from the other player which allowed both to do well" (Axelrod 1984, 112) .
The communal conflicts that concern us here rarely permit a fresh beginning and exhibit instead a long, oft-repeated history of mutual violence and distrust. Axelrod recognized that with simple TIT-FOR-TAT, "once a feud gets started, it can continue indefinitely" (Axelrod 1984, 138) . In later work Axelrod investigated tentative strategies for restoring cooperation when it has broken down. These include "generous" TIT FOR TAT (occasionally cooperating in the face of an opponent's defection) and "contrite" TIT FOR TAT (cooperating in response to defection that was in response to your own previous defection). 1 Such restorative strategies can work if they are employed about ten percent of the time, not more, otherwise they will be exploited (Axelrod 1997, 33-39) . They are useful here because they allow us both to pinpoint the potential contributions of leaders to cooperative outcomes, and to highlight the risks they must be willing to take. Because generous TIT FOR TAT will be exploited if used too frequently, any leader who employs it assumes a significant risk --for she or he must commit one hundred percent to the move once it is chosen.
Even more daunting is that in longstanding conflicts like those of South Africa, Northern
Ireland, and Israel-Palestine, it is misleading to speak of "restoring" cooperation (as in Axelrod's model) because no golden age of cooperation ever existed. Moreover, even if most people on both sides prefer peace to war, there typically remains a determined minority on each side that prefers war to any negotiated settlement (as repeatedly demonstrated in Northern Ireland and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.) Strategically hopeful leaders face the task of constructing inter-communal cooperation for the first time and creating an enduring constituency for it.
Axelrod did not address the role of leaders; the players in his models could just as well be whole communities, or even distinct species "cooperating" over the long span of evolutionary time (Axelrod 1984, 88-105) . His narrative of the tacit "Live and Let Live" ethic (which emerged across trench lines mutually to limit casualties in World War I) shows that 1 Axelrod explored the contrite and generous versions of TIT FOR TAT on the theory that we all know that people make mistakes from time, and would not want to be victims forever of an inadvertent error. To press forward with a cooperative opening, despite the daunting odds, is a mark of strategically hopeful leadership. In effect, such leaders internalize the costs of solving collective action problems that will otherwise continue plaguing their constituencies.
Game theorists typically assume that preferences remain fixed throughout the game and that players seek to maximize their payoffs while remaining indifferent to one another's utilities (Morrow 1994, 19-20, 34 ). Axelrod makes different and more illuminating psychological assumptions. He argues that in real-world approximations of the iterated prisoner's dilemma, "the very experience of sustained mutual cooperation altered the payoffs of the players, making mutual cooperation even more valued than it was before"; participants on the two sides began "to care about each other's welfare." The reverse also occurred: where cooperation failed, "a powerful ethic of revenge was evoked." Thus "not only did preferences affect outcomes, but behavior and outcomes also affected preferences" (Axelrod 1984, 85) .
Failed attempts at cooperation can reinforce tendencies to view conflicts as zero-sum, even when successful cooperation would have resulted in mutual gains. Axelrod observes that human beings need to learn that "most of life is not zero-sum" and that mutual cooperation is possible even if not always achieved. The successful experience of mutual cooperation can itself predispose human beings to view interactions in variable-sum rather than zero-sum terms (Axelrod 1984, 110-112) .
To have any chance of bridging longstanding divisions, strategically hopeful leaders must first judge for themselves that the longstanding conflict in which they are enmeshed is potentially positive-sum, and therefore capable of resolution. They have to believe, and persuade others to believe, that all parties lose so long as the conflict continues unabated (even if they lose unequally), and that all sides stand to gain if the conflict can be resolved.
Yet they recognize that accumulated bitterness and past failures to resolve the conflict have led many to perceive it as zero-sum: as a contest to be resolved only by victory for one side and defeat for the other. Game theoretic models (like the prisoner's dilemma) mask this judgment problem when utilities over outcomes are assigned to actors. The payoff schedule of a prisoner's dilemma indicates that both actors are better off if they cooperate; the problem is that neither can trust the other. Leaders attempting to resolve historic conflicts understand the trust problem, but they also face another, equally difficult challenge:
convincing skeptics on both sides that there is any potential outcome that could leave both parties better off. The mutual cooperation outcome in the prisoner's dilemma matrix, if never realized, may disappear altogether from participants' consciousness (Axelrod 1984, 110-112) , so that the interaction appears as a game of pure conflict. Thus strategically hopeful leaders must not only play the game strategically; they must also persuade others about which strategic game is being played.
Strategically hopeful leaders must also judge when and how to set aside preconditions. Strategically hopeful leaders need not make theoretical pronouncements about the nature of power. But they must recognize that their own power to secure a resolution acceptable to their own constituency depends upon preserving, and where necessary reinforcing, the power of the "enemy" leader across the table. The strategic temptation to weaken an antagonistic rival and divide the opposition must here be resisted; otherwise "enemy" leaders will be unable to persuade their constituencies to support an agreement. Leaders committed to resolving chronic conflict must recognize that in important respects their own power stands or falls with the power of their counterpart on the other side. This is easy to admit in principle but difficult to put into practice. 
III. Two leaders, two gambles
In 1985 Mandela recognized that overthrow of apartheid through outright military victory was "a distant if not impossible dream" (Mandela 1994, 457) . But the idea of armed struggle, even on a limited scale, was enormously important to the ANC rank and file and could not be easily relinquished. By 1985 the Soviet Union had cut off the financial and military support it earlier provided to the ANC and the South African Communist Party (Jung et. al. 2011, 94 ).
This would have increased the ANC's motivation to negotiate seriously with the government, but it also heightened the risk in doing so, because eagerness to talk might telegraph the ANC's diminished military capability and worsen its bargaining position. Under the circumstances, for Mandela to invite talks might betray ANC weakness in an increasingly high-stakes struggle. The government might have accepted Mandela's invitation, but with the ulterior aim of trapping him, discrediting him among his people and decapitating the ANC leadership at a crucial moment.
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Nevertheless Mandela decided to go forward. In his autobiography Long Walk to Freedom he describes why he did so, and also why he kept it secret from his ANC colleagues until he was committed:
I had concluded that ….if we did not start a dialogue soon, both sides would be plunged into a dark night of oppression, violence, and war…It simply did not make sense for both 3 During the 1980s competing forces within the South African government pushed policy toward the ANC in opposite directions: some sought to "decapitate" the ANC by dividing its leadership, while others sought to negotiate with the ANC in hopes of attaining a political settlement. The latter strategy presupposed an ANC leadership strong enough to negotiate. The immediate catalyst of the talks was a 1985 letter from Nelson Mandela to South African Justice Minister Kobie Coetsee. The "talks about talks" between Mandela and Coetsee began in early 1986 (Lodge 2006, 148-160 Once his initiative was underway, Mandela informed his ANC colleagues. Their responses were sharply divided, but most of them were, after the fact, guardedly willing to permit
Mandela to continue an action they would not have approved in advance (Mandela 1994, 457-459, 466-467 ; see also Lodge 2006, 158-160 ).
Mandela's observations could be summarized in strategic terms as follows:
1) The conflict between ANC and government, and by extension between black and white in South Africa, was potentially variable-sum. Even though most people on both sides perceived it as zero-sum, in fact both sides stood to gain from a political settlement and both sides would lose terribly in the event of an escalating racial civil war.
2) Nevertheless, if present trends continued, the lose-lose scenario ("dark night of oppression, violence, and war") was the more likely, because "both sides regarded discussions as a sign of weakness and betrayal." Without using the term, Mandela was describing a classic prisoners' dilemma.
3) A leader's duty is to resolve this impasse, to "move out ahead of the flock," hoping this act will get people to perceive, and act on, the positive-sum possibilities. But this is risky because the leader cannot control the process he/she sets in motion; the other side may indeed suspect weakness and escalate its demands.
4) In taking this step on his own authority, Mandela internalized much of the risk, thereby diminishing it for other ANC leaders. He realized that his initiative might backfire, and if it did
his position as a top ANC leader would have been finished. Indeed he recognized bargaining leverage with the government in the fact that, if "matters went awry," his ANC colleagues could limit the damage by renouncing the initiative of an irrelevant old man. Mandela might "move out ahead of his flock," but he knew that the "flock" ultimately retained the freedom to denounce him and refuse to follow.
Mandela's 1985 decision in prison to "talk to the enemy" was a vital link in the chain of events by which apartheid was replaced by racially inclusive democracy (Lodge 2006, 165-166 Afrikaner politician who displayed no reformist behavior. 4 But he had become convinced that apartheid had failed and that only fundamental reform "could pull South Africa back from the edge of the chasm on which we were teetering" (89). De Klerk's predecessor P.W. Botha had publicly admitted as early as 1979 that South Africans must "adapt or die," but Botha was unwilling or unable to follow through on this imperative or (in de Klerk's view) clearly to communicate the intention to do so (103-105). And even if Botha had been fully committed to reform, there was at the time no one on the ANC side with whom he could have negotiated.
In contrast, de Klerk knew from the outset of his presidency that Mandela had shown himself to be someone with whom "it would be possible for us to do business" (158) plans to release all political prisoners including Mandela, and to begin negotiations toward democracy (Jung and Shapiro 1996, 194-195; de Klerk 1998, 229-232) .
But by 1992 the success of de Klerk's reform effort was greatly endangered. Political violence had escalated, especially in Natal province between ANC supporters and followers of Mangosuthu Buthelezi's ethnically Zulu Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) -a conflict that brought South Africa as close as it ever came to civil war in the 1990s, and which de Klerk reports "almost destroyed our efforts to achieve a negotiated constitutional settlement" (de Klerk 1998, 193 (Jung and Shapiro 1996, 198-199) . The election results were widely interpreted as a rejection of the National Party's reform proposals on the part of white voters, who were at that point still the only voters who mattered. 6 "The mandate that I had received in 1989 from the white electorate was visibly slipping away from me and the National Party" (de Klerk 1998, 229-232 1998: 199-204, 258-267, 384-385; for Mandela's, see Mandela 1994, 509-515 . Subsequent investigations established that some members of the South African security forces were involved in illegal and violent covert activities. There is no evidence that De Klerk authorized these actions, and he attributed them to reactionary forces aiming to undermine his reforms. 6 South Africa's 1983 Constitution had created a so-called "tricameral parliament" in which Coloured (mixed race)
and Indian voters were permitted to vote for members of two separate and largely powerless chambers. Black South Africans, who made up the vast majority of the population, were still wholly disenfranchised under that constitution.
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In a subsequent interview de Klerk explained his reasoning in calling the referendum: that in the negative by-election results people were expressing their fears and dissatisfactions, but that when confronted squarely with the issue of the country's future they would rise to the occasion and embrace the need for change. There was no polling data on the subject. to face down the Afrikaner hard right; he also had to convince skeptics in the ANC that he could be trusted -this after the National Party government and the ANC had been through decades of bitter conflict in which countless numbers of people had been uprooted, imprisoned, tortured, and killed.
In characterizing his unilateral decision to initiate "talks about talks" Mandela pictured a shepherd moving out ahead of a flock. De Klerk, in characterizing his own challenge, favored river metaphors -in particular crossing the Rubicon. He observes that P. W. Botha realized the Rubicon would someday have to be crossed, but was unwilling to "take the unavoidable plunge" and accept that "partners in negotiation would have to include the ANC and its radical allies" (de Klerk 1998, 103-106 together, but each also hoped to gain more or lose less than the other). Both recognized that the other also viewed matters this way. Both knew there were hard-liners on both sides who saw the conflict as irreducibly zero-sum and anticipated a violent showdown. De Klerk observes of Mandela and himself: "We realized that we both bore the ultimate responsibility for ensuring that there would be a negotiated settlement and we were both committed to carrying out this responsibility" (de Klerk 1998, 169) . Mandela voiced the same idea in recognizing de Klerk's "genuine and indispensable contribution to the peace process" and observed that, "To make peace with an enemy one must work with that enemy, and that enemy becomes one's partner" (Mandela 1994, 533) . Both leaders believed that failure to cooperate would produce terrible consequences and horrifying losses for all sides -"a dark night of oppression, violence, and war" (Mandela 1994, 457) , "a prolonged struggle so bitter and destructive that there would be little left for anyone to inherit" (de Klerk 1998, 121 ).
Yet both also recognized conflict over the terms on which these common interests would be met. De Klerk and Mandela acted "in the full knowledge that we were opponents with divergent goals" (de Klerk 1998, 169). Mandela claimed that de Klerk "did not make any of his reforms with the intention of putting himself out of power" but "for precisely the opposite reason: to ensure power for the Afrikaner in a new dispensation" (Mandela 1994, 503) . In addition to differences of interest among the constituencies they represented and deep divergences between their constitutional proposals, there was little personal trust between Mandela and de Klerk during the negotiations process. Yet both were willing to take significant personal risks to bridge the racial divide, hoping that the other would reciprocate rather than exploit the move.
IV. Leadership, Strategic Interaction, and the Prisoner's Dilemma
Mandela and de Klerk realized that resolution of the conflict depended on an interdependent decision: neither party could impose a unilateral solution, but instead had to offer something ultimately acceptable both to the adversary and to their own constituencies. The tragedy of interdependent decision is that outcomes worse for all sides may result because leaders fail to agree on the terms of cooperation.
There is an enormous literature on leadership, scholarly and popular. "the art of political manipulation" -leaders strategically deploying words and actions to structure decision situations to their advantage, so that they get their way without having to persuade anyone to modify their preferences (Riker 1983; 1986 ; see also Dewan and Myatt 2012, 432) . For example, by manipulating the order in which a set of alternatives is voted on -without changing anyone's preferences -one can often win a decision that would have been lost had the voting order been different. Both Mandela and de Klerk were, among other things, skilled "political manipulators" in Riker's sense. Recall that at key moments both took risks that their colleagues would have opposed had they been consulted beforehand but were guardedly willing to support later. But for both Mandela and de Klerk short-term "agenda manipulation" was directed to longer term ends that could only be realized if other key elites and substantial numbers of their constituents were persuaded, through both word and act, to modify their political preferences. Riker's heresthetic cannot account for the choices made by Mandela and de Klerk.
The notion that leaders merely manipulate fixed preferences provoked an initially healthy, but now excessive and faddish, counter-reaction in the enormous literature on "transforming" leadership pioneered by James MacGregor Burns (Burns 1978; 2003; Conger 2004 ). In contrast to merely "transactional" leaders, "transformative" leaders create new possibilities by modifying the character and preferences of followers. Transformative leadership theories identify an important element missing from rational choice accounts, but too often treat transformation as a quality inhering in a charismatic leader, or emerging from that leader's interactions with committed followers. At least equally important for understanding acts of communal bridge-building are leaders' strategic interactions with rival leaders, and with their constituencies -for whom an adversary's charisma might actually be a threatening liability.
In the South African democratic transition, Mandela's transformative capacities depended on de Klerk's responses and vice-versa, and on their securing the support of their skeptical constituencies -as both leaders fully understood. For these reasons we find theories of strategic interaction, even when they exclude or underplay leadership, more useful to the problem at hand than much of the leadership literature. But at the same time we encourage greater attention to the way leadership can shape the outcome of strategic interactions.
Robert Axelrod's iterated prisoner's dilemma has already been discussed; here we consider strategic interaction theorists Thomas Schelling and Josep Colomer.
Schelling's The Strategy of Conflict, despite its vintage, remains among the most fruitful examinations of the type of decision problems considered here. Schelling makes a fundamental distinction between zero-sum (or "constant sum") conflicts, where "more for one participant inexorably means less for another"; and variable-sum, or "mixed motive" conflicts, in which "there are common as well as conflicting interests among the participants" and "mutual dependence as well as opposition." Strategy in a variable-sum game must take into account not only "the division of gains and losses between two claimants" but also "the possibility that particular outcomes are worse (better) for both claimants than certain other outcomes…There is a common interest in reaching outcomes that are mutually advantageous." Neither participant can fully control the outcome; instead, "the ability of one participant to gain his ends is dependent to an important degree on the choices or decisions that the other participant will make" (Schelling 1980, 5) . Cooperation might fail because whoever first indicates willingness to cooperate signals potential weakness and thus invites exploitation by the other side; or because either or both sides are unable credibly to commit themselves to positions from which they will not later be tempted or pressured to move. For negotiations to succeed, the expectations of both sides "must somehow converge on a single point at which each expects the other not to expect to be expected to retreat" (35, 70).
This means that if either party weakens the other too much, he will jeopardize the possibility of an agreement. Mandela illustrates Schelling's point when he writes that despite the frictions "I never sought to undermine Mr. de Klerk" because "the weaker he was, the weaker the negotiations process" (Mandela 1994, 533 he never forgot that de Klerk had his own constituencies to satisfy.
Schelling's variable-sum model aptly describes the South African racial power contest as perceived by both Mandela and de Klerk. Both leaders agreed that through cooperation each side stood to gain -at least compared to the likely outcome without cooperation. Both recognized the interdependent character of the decision: if the leadership on either side refuses to sign, or agrees to a pact they cannot persuade their constituency to support, then both sides lose, as do the leaders themselves, politically and personally. Each recognized that the other also recognized these things.
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But Mandela and de Klerk also understood something not provided for by Schelling: that whether a conflict is perceived as zero-sum or variable-sum may itself be at stake in what leaders do and say. Schelling takes as given that a conflict is either zero-sum or variablesum, which in turn is a function of the respective (and independently derived) preferences on each side. This initial classification is decisive because "the intellectual processes of choosing a strategy in pure conflict and choosing a strategy of coordination are of wholly different sorts" (Schelling 1980, 4, 96) . But Schelling does not explain how participants decide whether they believe the conflict to be zero-sum or variable-sum. Mandela's inviting "talks about talks" with the government in 1985 was risky because, though he himself saw the conflict as potentially variable-sum, he did not know whether his colleagues or the National Party government would agree. For Mandela to frame the conflict as involving potential shared gains was a hopeful act.
Even if leaders on both sides view a conflict as potentially variable-sum, cooperation might fail because their respective constituencies -who retain the power to block agreements and replace their leaders -might instead see the conflict as a fight to the finish. Mandela noted that many anti-apartheid activists in the early 1990s demanded "a victory on the battlefield, not the negotiating table" and he noticed signs at rallies that read, "MANDELA, GIVE US GUNS" and "VICTORY THROUGH BATTLE NOT TALK" (Mandela 1994, 506, 526) . De Klerk was no less aware of the white right who anticipated a violent showdown (1998, (316) (317) (318) (319) .
Both leaders thus faced the twin challenge: first skillfully to manage a difficult bargaining process with adversaries, and then to persuade a critical mass of the rank and file on both sides to agree with them.
Unlike some more formalized versions of rational choice theory, Schelling does not insist dogmatically on invariant preference functions. But his bargainers maximize their share of a fixed supply of gains from cooperation. He ignores the ways in which players with interdependent preferences can expand (or shrink) the available surplus depending on their behavior in successive rounds of bargaining. This is the performative dimension of cooperation: when successful, it creates a new reality (Austin 1975 ).
Schelling also downplays the moral character of leaders. For him, negotiations between warring underworld gangs, or between kidnappers and victims, do not differ in their strategic logic from any other bargaining situation in which conflict and cooperation are mixed (Schelling 1980, 12, 43-44 Mandela understood this fear and addressed it. "I have fought against white domination, and I have fought against black domination. I have cherished the ideal of a democratic and free society in which all persons live together in harmony and with equal opportunities" (Mandela 1994, 322; 2004, 59-62) . But it was his actions that made the statement believable, just as de Klerk's turning on the white right and plunging into the Rubicon established his credibility.
Taking these risks enabled them to persuade their supporters to rethink the conflict in variable-sum terms. Once they did, they could focus on their enduring common interests beneath the more obvious conflicts. Colomer seeks to explain why confrontation between regime and democratic opposition sometimes produces stable compromises in favor of democratic or semi-democratic institutions; and other times triggers "frontal conflict" whereby both sides "fight to eliminate each other," and consequently both risk "becoming an absolute loser" (Colomer 2000, 1-3) . 7 The military did not signal decisive support for the transition until March 1994, when they accepted an order from the Transitional Executive Council (by then the caretaker government) to put down a white separatist group in that was supporting a local black leader in the Tswana homeland of Bophuthatswana who opposed the coming elections (Jung and Shapiro 1996, 201-4 (Kahneman 2011, 19-108; 259-376) . Colomer employs generic actors representing strategic positions (like "moderate democratic opposition"), not individual leaders, even when he illustrates those positions with proper names like Gorbachev, Jaruzelski, and Havel (Colomer 2000, 41) . If the classic prisoner's dilemma underestimates 8 Colomer also examines what he labels "mugging games," which resemble prisoner's dilemmas in some respects Colomer assumes, for example, that actors' strategies will be weighted by a preference for peace over war: "A transition by agreement is less risky for the actors involved than a civil war" (Colomer 2000, 2) . This is true as a general proposition (otherwise negotiated solutions would be impossible). But for individual leaders it is often far more risky, politically and personally, to initiate a cooperative opening where there has been a long history of conflict and distrust than to do nothing. What would be ultimately risk-minimizing for the group, if it can be achieved, may be risk-augmenting for the leader who makes the first move. Colomer assumes that parties can retract a failed cooperative opening without significant cost. But the leader responsible for a failed opening might pay a higher price: disgrace, the end of a career, perhaps assassination. A strategically hopeful leader must take into account not only the risks and opportunities faced by both communities in any attempted reform, but also the individual risks he or she runs as leader, and the corresponding risks faced by leaders on the other side of the divide. The foresight required under such circumstances is more complex than the general recognition (which Colomer assumes) that both groups lose if they fail to cooperate.
Colomer also understates the difficulties of negotiated transitions by assuming "the absence or weakness of maximalist actors…the radical opposition and the radical hard-liners must be weak enough to be considered irrelevant in the main interactions" (Colomer 2000, 61) .
Whether this assumption fits the post-Soviet transitions may be debated; it is clearly unrealistic in many other circumstances. Even if large majorities on both sides favor peace, the process can be held captive by a committed minority that prefers war to any negotiated solution -as demonstrated with depressing regularity in Northern Ireland and the Middle East. Hard-liners cannot be assumed to be marginal; they must be actively marginalized if they cannot be convinced or coopted. This is among the most difficult and essential tasks of a strategically hopeful leader. If one cannot be confident that maximalist actors (in the adversary's camp as well as one's own) can no longer be effective spoilers, then one cannot know what strategic game is being played. For among maximalist actors it is a purely zerosum conflict, not a prisoner's dilemma.
V. Zero-sum and Variable-sum Power
The prisoner's dilemma is a parable of power and powerlessness. The interrogators are powerful because they make and enforce the rules of the game. The prisoners lack power to realize their common interests because they can neither alter the rules, nor trust one another to cooperate under those rules. With respect to utility, the prisoner's interaction is potentially variable-sum: mutual cooperation yields the highest aggregate utility and mutual defection the lowest. But with respect to power, their interaction appears zero-sum. For the only aspect of the interaction lying within each prisoner's control is deciding whether to cooperate or defect. Cooperation leaves one powerless and vulnerable. Defection promises each prisoner a small degree of power, though of course at the other's expense.
An iterated prisoner's dilemma creates a wider range of strategic options: if each actor must take into account future retaliation or cooperation by the other, defection is no longer obviously a dominant strategy. An invitation to mutual cooperation is sometimes successful, though it offers no guarantee. This expanded range of strategies, which Axelrod and others have examined, suggests an alteration of the power relations among the actors. This latter possibility has not received much discussion, perhaps because the concept of power is not explicitly employed in formal game theory, though assumptions about power are implicit in the structure of the game. 9 If under the classic one-shot prisoner's dilemma, each actor's power comes at the expense of the other, and aggregate power is fixed at a low level; then it should follow that, under an iterated prisoner's dilemma where reciprocity and trust can potentially emerge, the power of each actor does not necessarily come at the other's expense, and the power available to both actors is potentially variable, not fixed. This hypothesis requires that we examine the concept of power itself.
The meaning of power has long been contested (Lukes 2005, 14-38, 60-107) . Hobbes defined it as one's "present means to obtain some future apparent good" (Hobbes 2010, 93) .
This definition of power is not inherently zero-sum; in principle we might secure our own good by cooperating with others in realizing theirs. But where interests conflict, or where shared interests go unrealized because trust is absent (as in the state of nature), power for
Hobbes becomes zero-sum in practice. Thus elsewhere Hobbes provides the classic zerosum description of power: "Because the power of one man resisteth and hindereth the effects of the power of another: power simply is no more, but the excess of the power of one above that of another. For equal powers opposed, destroy one another, and such their opposition is called contention" (Hobbes 1928, 26 ).
For Hobbes, one's power is demonstrated through victory in a head-to-head contest. This premise is shared by the realist school of international relations theory, who perceive an anarchic realm in which war-winning capacity counts above all (Gilpin 1981, 94; Mearsheimer 2001, 2) . But Hobbes's idea is also echoed in the way many political scientists have defined power even under the operation of peaceful democratic rules. According to
Nelson Polsby -speaking here as a "pluralist" in the so-called three faces of power debate that began in the 1960s -in studying power within a political community we should focus above all on who wins and who loses in a "direct conflict between actors" because this is the best measure of their respective "capacities to affect outcomes" (quoted in Lukes 2005, 18) .
The "radicals" in this faces of power debate pointed out that conflict and domination were not always readily visible. But they did not call into question the assumption that power always comes at another's expense; on the contrary they drove that premise further. ( Conflict and inequality are always relevant to describing political power. The more problematic assumption is that A's capacity to "affect outcomes" is a direct function of B's lack of capacity to affect those same outcomes. This doubtless describes many power relations, but not the negotiations between Mandela and de Klerk. If those interactions were conflictual and "subtractive" in some respects, they were cooperative and "additive" in others.
Conflict and cooperation fused in the same complex relation; both equally shaped outcomes.
To comprehend as power only the conflict and ignore the cooperation -as though cooperation were passive, something other than power -is to misunderstand the power relationship itself.
The assumption that power is inherently zero-sum has not gone unchallenged. Power has alternatively been defined as the cooperative capacity to achieve collectively shared aims (Talcott Parsons) or the general capacity of human beings to "act together" (Hannah Arendt).
But Parsons's and Arendt's arguments, though insightful, are flawed by their treating power as almost wholly consensual and cooperative, thus neglecting the element of conflict that preoccupies other theorists of power (for discussion and critique see Lukes 2005, 30-35; Read 2012) . Some other challenges to the zero-sum view do incorporate both conflict and cooperation, but do not develop an alternative variable-sum description in much detail (for example Giddens 1984; Baldwin 2002; Wrong 1995 ; for a more fully-developed variable-sum argument incorporating both cooperation and conflict see Haugaard 2012) . The zero-sum view of power, despite its one-sidedness, has produced rich descriptions of political life (for example Gaventa 1980) . The variable-sum alternative view, to be fully persuasive, must pass this same test.
The political interactions between Mandela and de Klerk, and by extension between the constituencies they led, suggest that a variable-sum theory of power can persuasively describe significant dimensions of political life -without neglecting inequality, domination, the potential for violence, and the persistence of conflict. Both Mandela and de Klerk implicitly perceived the racial struggle in variable-sum, not zero-sum terms. When Mandela reminded
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South Africans that "I have fought against white domination, and I have fought against black domination," he was challenging a pernicious zero-sum assumption about power: that liberation for either community entailed domination for the other. Mandela's strategically hopeful view -one shared with de Klerk, despite their divergent constitutional visions -was that black South Africans could be liberated without dominating whites (or any other group of this multiracial society).
10
But Mandela and de Klerk also realized that many South Africans on all sides saw one group's gain as the other's loss, and feared that this zero-sum view would produce a negative-sum outcome unless the leaders actively cooperated to prevent it. Both were fully aware of the conflicting aims of their respective constituencies and of their personal conflicts as rival leaders. Yet both also recognized that each had to keep the other strong enough to be able to secure the support of their constituencies for any negotiated settlement, and for this reason could not push an advantage too far. They can be imagined as actors in a prisoner's dilemma who, by taking risks to generate trust, have found a way out of the prison.
In the classic prisoner's dilemma the powerlessness of each ensures the defection of both.
Mandela and de Klerk overcame this dilemma because their interactions generated new power on both sides.
The variable-sum view of power sketched out above does not "refute" the more common assumption that gains of power for some entail losses of power for others. The "your gain is my loss" suspicion remains relevant for at least two reasons. First, even where power is cooperatively generated, there remain important respects in which power gains for some involve power losses for others. In a stable democracy rival parties compete for a fixed number of powerful offices even as they cooperate to maintain the power of the democratic system itself (whose long-term survival can never be taken for granted). In the South African case, the reversal-of-domination scenario so feared by white South Africans did not come to pass, in part because de Klerk and Mandela cooperated to prevent it. In this sense the variable-sum model best captures events. Yet it is undeniable that white South Africans had to relinquish significant political power in order for black South Africans to gain new political power in the transition to non-racial democracy; in this sense the zero-sum view retains its attraction.
Another reason the zero-sum hypothesis cannot be dismissed is that it retains the power of a self-fulfilling prophesy. If one views power as radically zero-sum, one can indeed make it zero-sum. Had either Mandela or de Klerk been replaced by leaders who perceived the racial power contest in zero-sum terms and acted accordingly, political meltdown and an escalation of racial war would have been the likely outcome. A zero-sum power strategy, once decided upon, will "prove itself correct" because the adversary responds in kind. A 10 For present purposes we ignore the interactions between both sides and the then two million or so "Cape Coloureds" as well as the ethnic Zulu Inkatha Freedom Party. For discussion see Jung and Shapiro 1996, 185-99, 201-13; and Jung, Lust-Okar and Shapiro 2011, 105, 122, 146-53. strategically hopeful opening, in contrast, might fail. Either strategy is rationally defensible.
Either understanding of power can fit the facts of the conflict. There may be no "best strategy" but instead a morally-charged choice among strategies.
VI. Unionists and Nationalists, Israelis and Palestinians
The South African constitutional resolution was not replicated in Northern Ireland or Israel.
Those conflicts differ in their histories, the ideologies invoked, the role of outside actors, and the design of the settlements realized or proposed. It is illuminating, nonetheless, to take account of some shared similarities from the perspective developed here. First, they are (or were, in South Africa's case) high-intensity, self-reinforcing, protracted conflicts with no visible end in sight. If anything, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict appeared to many commentators during the late 1970s the most likely to be resolved, and South Africa the least. Particular circumstances have always shaped the direction and intensity of these conflicts, but none of them seemed likely to dissipate merely by a favorable turn of events.
Second, none of the conflicts could be resolved by a decisive victory followed by an imposed solution. They are what Samuel Huntington described as "transplacements" and Adam
Przeworski as "extrications"-situations in which any resolution must be negotiated because, although both parties lack the power to impose unilateral solutions, the potential exists for reformers in the government and moderates in the opposition to negotiate a settlement that would command enough support to survive (Huntington 1991, 113-114, 152; Przeworksi 1991, 67-69) .
Finally, all three of the conflicts could be described either as zero-sum or variable-sum, depending on how one frames them and whether one regards the preferences of the principal actors as fixed or dynamic. There was nothing about the South African conflict that made it inherently more variable-sum than the other two. Apartheid was obviously incompatible with non-racial democracy. Viewing Northern Ireland as an integral part of the Republic of Ireland contradicts the ideology that it is a permanent part of the United Kingdom. Israelis and Palestinians advance irreconcilable historical and religious claims to exclusive possession of the same land. If human beings were no more than replicas of the ideologies they espouse, then all of these conflicts would be inescapably zero-sum. In fact, people who live through chronic conflicts often suffer greatly, and most appear to place more value on physical and economic security and personal liberty than on pursuing ideological stances to their ultimate conclusion. 11 The desire for these goods can generate a politics of battle, a politics of reconciliation, or some mix -depending the strategies chosen and the responses they call forth.
11 In the 2010 Northern Ireland Life and Times survey, for example, only 13% of respondents said they would find it "almost impossible to accept" if Northern Ireland were ultimately to be joined to the Republic of Ireland; 85% of respondents would either "happily accept" or "could live with" this result. Alternatively, if Northern Ireland were never to join the Republic of Ireland, only 2% found this "almost impossible to accept" while 93% would either "happily accept" or "could live with" this result. "Improving cross-community relations" and reducing unemployment were ranked as higher priorities than resolution of the national affiliation question. http://www.ark.ac.uk/nilt/2010/Political_Attitudes/index.html [09-12-2012] . Recent surveys of Palestinians indicate that practical concerns like employment and physical security have highest priority. Palestinian Center for Public Opinion, www.pcpo.org/polls.htm [09-12-2012] .
Protracted, self-reinforcing conflicts will continue unless a leader of at least one of the parties stakes their career on altering the dynamic. Even so, the odds of failure are high; there are many more ways for negotiations to fail than for them to succeed. And leaders who successfully bridge the abyss against the odds may receive few political rewards for doing so, as the Northern Ireland case demonstrates.
The 1998 Good Friday (or Belfast) Agreement should be considered a qualified success because it has ended most of the political violence, and all significant players have remained committed to employing only peaceful means in pursuit of their political goals. (Peace efforts stalled whenever parties insisted on hard preconditions and advanced only when preconditions were waived; see Mitchell 1999, 22-38) Gerry Adams, the Sinn Féin leader who eventually turned the republican movement toward politics and (gradually) away from violence, never forgot that in doing so he risked assassination (Powell 2008:100, 147-148 ).
Yet (McGlynn et. al. 2012, 10-14) .
Because other unionist parties were opposed to the Good Friday Agreement, its success critically depended on the Ulster Unionist Party (UUP) and its leader David Trimble. Trimble's party and political career afterward suffered eclipse for his efforts, in part because the IRA's long delay in disarming left him hanging (Powell 2008, 203-205) . But Trimble's own limitations as a leader contributed. In 1997 he made the risky decision to enter negotiations that could have gutted his support base, and he kept the UUP at the table despite significant opposition within his own party and right-wing charges that he was betraying his own people (Mitchell 1999, 108-117 Leaders of this Yes Campaign repeatedly advised Trimble "to become more forthright and to engage in more active campaigning," and in the final weeks before the vote Trimble did become more active (Hancock 2011, 103, 111 an agreement that showed strong signs of being potentially viable (Jung et.al. 2011, 107-114) .
By 1995 both Rabin and Arafat were favorably positioned to manage the hard-liners on their respective flanks and consummate an agreement, the main elements of which had been hammered out in secret negotiations in Oslo and then announced in the fall of 1993. Rankand-file support was strong in both communities for the two-state solution envisaged at Oslo.
Rabin was a war hero whose dedication to Israel's security was not in doubt. Arafat included Hamas) have not placed a high enough priority on resolving the conflict to build support for a new dispensation and take the risks that would be needed to advance its prospects for success. Indeed, both have countenanced policies that seem likely to worsen it. But further entrenching the status quo is not risk-free either. Leaders who refuse to take risks to recast festering conflicts in positive sum terms thereby increase the costs and dangers faced by someone else, somewhere else, sometime in the future. 
VII. Conclusion
We have argued here that strategically hopeful action by leaders who are willing to take calculated risks is necessary for transforming political orders characterized by histories of divisive, violent, communal conflict. One vital characteristic of such leaders is their capacity, despite the bitter history, to view a conflict that is widely perceived to be zero-sum as potentially positive sum.
We do not claim that strategically hopeful leadership is sufficient; any number of factors outside a leader's control may cause even a carefully-calculated, risk-taking effort to fail. And sometimes, as we noted with respect to the Israel-Palestine conflict since the mid-1990s, the chances might be vanishingly slim. But we do argue that such action is necessary: without it the chronic conflict will remain beyond the possibility of resolution, even if the stars align in every other respect. Political leadership of a more routine character, whereby leaders respond "rationally" to the most visible and concrete forms of political reward and punishment, cannot bridge the abyss. On the contrary, all of the ordinary political incentives favor action reinforcing the status quo.
Grassroots efforts by civic or religious associations to foster inter-communal trust may be advantageous in preparing the ground for political efforts at the top, and in consolidating an agreement once its institutional arrangements have been delineated. And initiatives of this kind keep alive some glimmer of hope during long stretches of political darkness. But bottom-up action cannot by itself overcome the enormous collective action problems that stand in the way of negotiating, ratifying, and consolidating political support for new institutions acceptable to all sides. Only highly-placed political leaders, accountable to the groups engaged in conflict, can accomplish this, and only if they are willing to take significant risks of the kind we have described.
If our analysis here challenges leaders to take risks for peace, it also challenges social scientists and political theorists to look differently at leadership, interdependent decision, conflict, and power. Leadership theories that feature profit-maximizing elites who manipulate fixed preferences, or alternatively attribute extraordinary transformative powers to heroic individual leaders, miss vital dimensions of Mandela's and de Klerk's joint accomplishment.
Theories of mixed-motive interdependent decision, exemplified here by Axelrod, Schelling, and Colomer, provide better starting-points for the problem at hand. But their theories also face limitations from failing to explore the dynamic possibilities opened by leaders who are willing to take unusual risks, in the hope that others will reciprocate rather than exploit them.
Our understanding of political power would be deepened by attention to the peculiar blend of conflict and cooperation in power interactions of the sort that facilitated South Africa's relatively peaceful -and surprising -democratic transition.
I H S -Read & Shapiro/ Transforming Power Relationships -37
When Nelson Mandela was released from prison in 1990, the world seemed to be blissfully proceeding toward resolution of many long-festering conflicts, not only in South Africa but also in Eastern Europe with the fall of communism, in Latin America, and elsewhere. At the time it may have seemed that Mandela, de Klerk, and South Africa achieved what they did by riding some "wave of history." But the optimistic global mood of the early 1990s soon gave way to some ghastly nightmares, as in the former Yugoslavia at the same moment that Mandela and de Klerk were heading off disaster in South Africa. A cascading mood of optimism will not substitute for leaders who are willing and able to take risks at the critical junctures when these are required. In retrospect it is clear that Mandela and de Klerk did not merely ride a wave. They bet on one another when they had good reasons not to, displaying hope for the future that transformed the present and its possibilities. This enabled them to dismantle apartheid without destroying their country in the process, an achievement that commends itself to our attention today no less than it did in 1994.
